Security usability
This is a WIP page, come back later.
This is a quick page on my feelings towards security and how most security software fails to be usable.
Background
Recently I read the article F-Droid: how is it weakening the Android security model? which provides a critique of F-Droid's security model and recommends people use Google Play Store.
The GrapheneOS developers provided similar critique but it contains numerous uncorrected errors. Instead of correcting this information they have chosen to threaten SylvieLorxu with legal action for pointing out these mistakes. I strongly recommend reconsidering any trust towards GrapheneOS and its developers given their priorities shown here.
Usability
When you look at the current state of open source you tend to see two things:
- Security software is near perfect, able to prevent attacks from state actors
- People don't use the security software correctly
There's generally two places you could blame for this:
- Developers for making unusable software
- Users for using software incorrectly
In recent years the latter camp of blaming the user has died down given it's not very actionable to solve.
People have predictable patterns when it comes to usability:
- Pick the easiest way to accomplish a task
- Become complacent and skip tasks
- Do things wrong
- Fail at impossible tasks
Any process that humans interact with have to account for these patterns and lower risk to an acceptable level.
Hypothetical case studies
Some concrete example of applications
user patterns
how people actually work
exceptions vs reality
Trust
security is a software problem to a social issue
libertarian threat model
not how reality works
bitcoin, keys