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[[Category:Research]] {{DISPLAYTITLE:nopl}}
[[Category:Research]] {{DISPLAYTITLE:nopl}}
During research for my [[AMD Geode]] projects, I found an amazing saga based around a CPU instruction. Nobody else has written this up from what I can see, so here's my take.
During research for my [[Geode Repair]] projects, I found an amazing saga based around a CPU instruction. Nobody else has written this up from what I can see, so here's my take.


== Background ==
== Background ==
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In 1998 Christian Ludloff documented in his [https://web.archive.org/web/19981205142152/http://sandpile.org:80/80x86/opcodes2.shtml updated map of 2 byte x86 opcodes] that the 0F 18 through 0F 1F range of opcodes were hinting NOPs. The first being the 0F 18 opcode which maps to PREFETCHh instructions. I believe this information was documented first in the [https://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/academic/class/15213-s01/docs/intel-opt.pdf Intel Architecture Optimization Reference Manual].
In 1998 Christian Ludloff documented in his [https://web.archive.org/web/19981205142152/http://sandpile.org:80/80x86/opcodes2.shtml updated map of 2 byte x86 opcodes] that the 0F 18 through 0F 1F range of opcodes were hinting NOPs. The first being the 0F 18 opcode which maps to PREFETCHh instructions. I believe this information was documented first in the [https://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/academic/class/15213-s01/docs/intel-opt.pdf Intel Architecture Optimization Reference Manual].


Later in 2003 Christian Ludloff clarified in an email thread [https://web.archive.org/web/20041106070621/http://www.sandpile.org/post/msgs/20004129.htm Undocumented opcodes (HINT_NOP)] that these hinting NOPs were declared by Intel in their 1995 patent [https://patents.google.com/patent/US5701442A/en US5701442]. The idea behind this patent from my reading is that you can encode a program written in another ISA as a series of opcodes that are run as NOPs on older machines and the new ISA on a newer machine.
Later in 2003 Christian Ludloff clarified in an email thread [http://www.sandpile.org/post/msgs/20004129.htm Undocumented opcodes (HINT_NOP)] that these hinting NOPs were declared by Intel in their 1995 patent [https://patents.google.com/patent/US5701442A/en US5701442]. The idea behind this patent from my reading is that you can encode a program written in another ISA as a series of opcodes that are run as NOPs on older machines and the new ISA on a newer machine.


I'm not sure why, but third party x86 CPUs aside from AMD didn't implement these NOPs. Perhaps Intel kept this patent close to their heart? Or maybe it's just not worth spending silicon and research on NOPs that nobody used?
I'm not sure why, but third party x86 CPUs aside from AMD didn't implement these NOPs. Perhaps Intel kept this patent close to their heart? Or maybe it's just not worth spending silicon and research on NOPs that nobody used?
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In 2020 [https://github.com/sarah-walker-pcem/pcem/commit/b973755ca376dbb47c3a8c85a53f4058f0ccc54d Add hintable NOPs for Pentium Pro and II.] was committed to PCem.
In 2020 [https://github.com/sarah-walker-pcem/pcem/commit/b973755ca376dbb47c3a8c85a53f4058f0ccc54d Add hintable NOPs for Pentium Pro and II.] was committed to PCem.


In 2022 [https://github.com/joncampbell123/dosbox-x/pull/3390 src/cpu: Implement hinting NOPs] was merged to DOSBox-X, the only DOSBox variant that supports Pentium Pro and newer CPUs.
As for 2022 no DOSBox variant supports these hinting NOPs.


== Intel CET ==
== Intel CET ==
In 2016 Intel announced [https://web.archive.org/web/20160614162220/http://blogs.intel.com/evangelists/2016/06/09/intel-release-new-technology-specifications-protect-rop-attacks/ Control-flow Enforcement Technology] and released the [https://web.archive.org/web/20170320213641/https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf Intel CET specification]. These CPU extensions run not just in 64-bit mode but in 32-bit mode. While management for the shadow stack uses new instructions, the ENDBRANCH instruction intended to be compiled in to user space code re-uses the hinting NOP 0F 1E.  
In 2016 Intel announced [https://web.archive.org/web/20160614162220/http://blogs.intel.com/evangelists/2016/06/09/intel-release-new-technology-specifications-protect-rop-attacks/ Control-flow Enforcement Technology] and released the [https://web.archive.org/web/20170320213641/https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf Intel CET specification]. These CPU extensions run not just in 64-bit mode but in 32-bit mode. While management for the shadow stack uses new instructions, the ENDBRANCH instruction intended to be compiled in to user space code re-uses the hinting NOP 0F 1E.  
Unlike the multi-byte NOP there's no indication in the specifications that these instructions are limited to Pentium Pro or newer CPUs.


In 2017 [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=603555e563725616246912711419637add54c961 Add support for Intel CET instructions] was committed to the GNU Assembler.
In 2017 [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=603555e563725616246912711419637add54c961 Add support for Intel CET instructions] was committed to the GNU Assembler.
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Later in 2017 [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=2a25448c490b16eea276521d818640bcaca75e35 Update x86 backend to enable Intel CET.] was committed to GNU GCC.
Later in 2017 [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=2a25448c490b16eea276521d818640bcaca75e35 Update x86 backend to enable Intel CET.] was committed to GNU GCC.


Even later in 2017 [https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/fec21ec0c6257eb24290c483b03b4fd9e6a9d0d1 LLVM r318995] added support for CET. As far as I can still this doesn't limit the use of these CET instructions.
Even later in 2017 [https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/fec21ec0c6257eb24290c483b03b4fd9e6a9d0d1 LLVM r318995] added support for CET.


In 2021 [https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=98667 gcc generates endbr32 invalid opcode on -march=i486] was reported to GCC. The next day [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=77d372abec0fbf2cfe922e3140ee3410248f979e x86: Error on -fcf-protection with incompatible target] was committed to GNU GCC. This patch limits CET to architectures with CMOV. That's a safe bet, but seems like it would break on the Geode LX800 and other i686-compatibles that lack multi-byte NOPs.
In 2021 [https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=98667 gcc generates endbr32 invalid opcode on -march=i486] was reported to GCC. The next day [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=77d372abec0fbf2cfe922e3140ee3410248f979e x86: Error on -fcf-protection with incompatible target] was committed to GNU GCC. This patch limits CET to architectures with CMOV. That's a safe bet, but seems like it would break on the Geode LX800 and other i686-compatibles that lack multi-byte NOPs.
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In 2022 [https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/93059 i586-unknown-linux-gnu target generates binaries containing Intel CET opcodes which are illegal on i586 processors] was reported to the Rust bug tracker. A day or so later Gentoo committed [https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/commit/bff66eedb4ae530ef21187d617daeba5472320a1 dev-lang/rust: pass -fcf-protection=none on i586] despite Rust not being available on i586 yet. It's unclear how much things will break if someone gets an actual i686 build of Rust going.
In 2022 [https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/93059 i586-unknown-linux-gnu target generates binaries containing Intel CET opcodes which are illegal on i586 processors] was reported to the Rust bug tracker. A day or so later Gentoo committed [https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/commit/bff66eedb4ae530ef21187d617daeba5472320a1 dev-lang/rust: pass -fcf-protection=none on i586] despite Rust not being available on i586 yet. It's unclear how much things will break if someone gets an actual i686 build of Rust going.


Rust uses LLVM so this might indicate that LLVM doesn't check if an architecture supports CET before adding its instructions.
TODO: isCFProtectionSupported IndirectBranchTracking


As of early 2022 Intel CET support is not in the kernel yet.
As of early 2022 Intel CET support is not in the kernel yet.
== Conclusions ==
I have a few takeaways from this slow motion train wreck:
* Intel's documentation only applies to Intel CPUs
* Developers don't really question retroactive additions to instruction sets
* To some i686 is the Pentium Pro
* To others i686 is a baseline for various 32-bit x86 processors
Something else to just tack on here is that I spent a non-trivial amount of time trying to dig up old copies of Intel web pages and documentation. By the way Intel: When you make a new revision of a document you don't have to destroy the old ones.
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